



Partnershio Note- Executed by Partner-B urden of Proof.-
Buettner v. Steinbrecker et al., 6o N. W. Rep. 177. The burden of
proof rests with a firm to show, where one partner under the firm
name executed a note for his own use, that such instrument is
not an obligation of the firm or within the scope of its business.
The second partner had allowed loans made on the strength of
this note to be used for firm purposes. It was thus ratified and
an innocent holder was entitled to recover against the firm.
Parties to, a Suit for Acconting-Harper v. Anderson ct al., 37
Pac. Rep. 926 (Cal.). Where action is taken against both the
retiring member of a firm and the one buying out such interest
for alleged accounts collected by the new member through pro-
curement of the retiring partner, a nonsuit as to the party buying
out the retiring partner is sustained.
Assignment-Firm and Individual Creditors.-Calhoun v. Bank of
Greenwood, 20 S. E. Rep. 153 (S. C.). Assignments are made by
both a bank firm and a member of it, to whom the bank is
indebted. In the distribution of assets the assignee for the indi-
vidual creditors cannot stand on an equal footing with the part-
nership creditors, the firm assets being primarily liable for the
payment of partnership debts.
Partnersho Accounting-Claims of Surviving Partner.-Painter et
al. v. Painter et al., 36 Pac. Rep. 865 (Col.). The deceased mem-
ber of a firm engaged in making city directories had left an
indebtedness, owing to the unprofitableness of the business, and,
afterwards, the undertaking proving successful, an action was
brought by the personal representatives for an accounting to
include all the assets at the tinie of the suit. Held that the sur-
vivor having managed the business with skill and industry, should
receive a fair allowance of the assets by reason of compensation
for his services, and that the claim against the deceased partner
should be adjusted by taking into account the good-will of the old
firm, working out a settlement of the partnership, and not by
presenting such claim against the estate of the deceased.
foint-Stock Companies- Failure to Record Artidcles-Liabiliy as
General Partners.-Hinds et al. v. Batin et al., 3
o Atlantic Rep.
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164 (Penn.). A contract was entered into between the plaintiffs
and the Scranton Match Co. before articles of association had
been recorded. Such contract was in the nature of a proposal of
the defendants, subject to approval after the joint-stock company
had recorded its articles of association. Such approval was made,
and, subsequently, the company went into liquidation. The de-
fendants were not, therefore, liable as individuals or general
partners under the existing circumstances of delay in recording
the articles of association, after commencement of the contract
relations.
NEGOTIABLE PAPER.
Promissory Note-Acon by Indorsee-ailore of Consideration.-
Merchants' &- Planters' Bank v. Afillsaps, 15 South. Rep. 659 (Miss.).
When, by statute, the maker of a note is allowed to plead want or
failure of consideration to an action by the indorsee, he is not
bound to pay a note, for which the consideration has failed, even
though he has obtained an extension of time from the indorsee,
provided he makes no promise to pay, to secure such extension.
Alteration of Note-Browning v. Gosnell et al., 59 N. W. Rep. 340
(Iowa). The signing of a fully executed and delivered note, by a
stranger, is such an alteration as to discharge previous signers, if
they have had no notice, and such stranger may be held on the
note.
Attachment-Action by Sheriff on Note-Defenses.-Nichols v. Hill,
19 S. E. Rep. ro17 (S. C.). All defenses may be set up to an
action, by a sheriff, on a note taken by attachment, which could
be set up by the defendant in the attachment suit.
Action on Note-Defenses.--ulley v. Chedic et al., 36 Pac. Rep.
783 (Nev.). The defense of revocation, by subsequent recovery
of a gift made causa mortis, of a note transferred by indorsement,
may be made by the donor alone, as the gift is merely voidable.
The right of payment on such a note may not be challenged by
the maker or his creditors.
Ziabili.y of Drawer on Certified Cleck.-Cincinnati Oyster and Fisk
Co. v. Naional Lafayette Bank, 36 N. E. Rep. 833 (Ohio). It is
no defense to an action on a check, which had been presented at
the bank on which it was drawn, within a reasonable time and
due notice sent to the drawer of its non-payment, owing to the
insolvency of said bank, that such check had previously been
certified by said bank.
.RNC'T CASES.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
Act to Reimburse Public Officer- When Public- Validi-.McClel-
land, Trustee et al. v. State ex rel Speer, 37 N. E. Rep. 1o89 (Ind.).
The Act, April 8, i885, to reimburse a certain township trus-
tee, by taxation of the township, for money lost by him by the
failure of a bank in which it was deposited, and to release him
and the sureties in his bond from liability, is inoperative and void,
because the legislature has no power to raise money by taxation
for private objects and purposes, but only for public purposes;
especially where the money lost by the failure of the bank belonged
to a fund which was not raised by taxation; also that part of the
Act relating to a release of the trustee and his sureties in his bond
from liability violates the Bill of Rights, which provides that no
law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.
Trade-Mark.-Cohn v. People, 37 N. E. Rep. 6o (Ill.). A Statute
of Illinois entitled, "An Act to Protect Associations, Unions of
Workingmen, and Persons in Their Labels, Trade-Marks and
Forms of Advertising," is not unconstitutional as granting special
privileges to certain associations contrary to the Illinois Constitu-
tion, as it gives the right to all associations whether composed of
workingmen or not. A cigar label, which states that " the cigars
contained in this box have been made by a first-class workman, a
member of the Cigarmakers' International Union of America, an
organization opposed to inferior, rat-shop, coolie, prison, or filthy
tenement house workmanship," is not illegal, as being immoral,
or against public policy, because the label attacks no other cigar
manufacturer but commends the cigars to which it is attached.
Prize Fighting-Glove Contest-Athletic Club-Forfeiture of Char-
ter.-State v. Olympic Club, 15 South. Rep. 19o (La.). Where
a criminal statute makes what is commonly called prize fighting a
misdemeanor punishable by fine and imprisonment, but contains a
provision that the statute shall not apply to exhibitions and glove
contests between human beings which may take place within the
rooms of regularly chartered athletic clubs, it is a question of fact
for the jury or court to determine whether any given contest or
series of contests are prize fights or glove contests; and the court
will not disturb a finding of the jury as to the fact. Moreover, if
such contests are violative of good morals and of a sound public
policy, the remedy comes within the power of the legislative
department of the government, and the court cannot on these
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grounds annul the Charter of a Corporation for doing acts per-
mitted by the Legislature.
THal by Jury.-State v. Griffin, 29 Atl. Rep. 414 (N. H.).
The law of New Hampshire requiring an appellant from
a sentence of a justice of the peace to pay certain fees, is not an
infringement of the constitutional right to a trial by jury, as the
amount of such fees is less than the amount of those required by
the Act of 1718, which was in force at the time of the adoption of
that provision of the constitution, and the trial by jury secured to
the subject by the constitution is a trial according to the course of
the common law, and the same, in substance, as that which was
in use when the constitution was framed.
CRIMINAL LAW.
.Burglar--Evidence.-State v. Valwell, 29 Atl. Rep. ioi8 (Vt.).
On a trial for burglary'the State proved that two of the defend-
ants entered a house and stole property, while a third remained
in their wagon. Evidence that earlier in the same night the latter
participated with them in burglarizing another house was held
admissible, as tending to show that he was cognizant of the sec-
ond crime.
Homicide-.Dying Declarations.-Boulden v. State, 15 S. Rep. 341
(Ala.). Statements of the deceased sought to be introduced as a
dying declaration are not necessarily inadmissible because death
did not occur until two months after they were made.
Criminal Jurisdiction-Division of Couni--Bfect of Pending Prose-
cution.-Peo.ple v. Stokes, 37 Pac. Rep. 207 (Cal.). While a criminal
prosecution was pending, that part of the county in which the
offense was committed was organized into a new county, and the
prosecution was -dismissed. Afterward the defendant was tried
and convicted in the new county, which on appeal was held to
have jurisdiction of the offense.
Evidence-Recalling Jury-Additional Instructions.-State v. Hale,
59 N. W. Rep. 281 (Iowa). Upon the jury being called in to
receive additional instructions from the Court defendant and his
counsel were not present. Reasonable efforts having been made
to find them, but without success, the instructions were delivered.
Held that their absence was not under such circumstances ground
for a new trial.
Extradition.-Carr v. State, 16 S. Rep. izo (Ala.). A person
who has been surrendered by one State to another upon requisi-
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tion, may be tried for an offense other than that designated in the
requisition before being tried for the latter, or allowed to return
to the State which surrendered him.
False Imprisonent-Evidence-Damages.-Sandum et al. v. Wells,
26 S. W. Rep. iooi (Tex.). When a case of false imprisonment
occurs, the sureties of the constable serving the process, are not
liable unless it can be definitely proved that he was acting within
his special and legal authority. The court held further that the
character .of the business of the person distrained should also be
considered in estimating damages. That the mental suffering
endured is a matter of fact for the jury, and no testimony of a
witness as to it is admissible. And that the thoroughly honest
intent of the constable is admissible as a mitigating cause.
GENERAL CASES.
Action on Note-joint Liability.-Stevens et al. v. Catlin, 37 N. E.
Rep. 1023 (Ill.). Upon the death of one of four joint parties to a
promissory note, it was claimed that the surviving promisors
could not be sued jointly. The Court held that the death of one
did not affect the liability of the remaining parties to the note.
Damages-Afaterials for Building-Delay in Furnishing-Injury to
Building by Rains.-Carnegie, Phopls 6- Co. (Limited) v. Holt, 58 N.
W. Rep. 623 (Mich.). Plaintiffs sold to defendant steel pillars and
beams for a building, to be furnished upon "reasonable notice"
as ordered by defendant's architect. Defendant sought damages
for delay in furnishing such materials, on the ground that this
delay postponed the completion of the building until January ist,
and that in December heavy rain-storms filled the basement with
water, causing the foundation to sink on one side, and also that
the walls being wet the plastering was affected. The Court held
that the injury to the building from the rains was too remote to
constitute an element of damage, and that the drenching of the
building by a December rain-storm was not an ordinary proximate
and direct result of plaintiffs' delay, as a rain-storm might have
come in any other month as well as in December.
Res Judicata-County Swamp Lands-Validity of Contract.-Win.
Brown Estate Co. v. Wayne Co., 27 S. W. Rep. 322 (Mo.). The
Supreme Court, in an action between third parties upon matters
involved in a contract for the sale of swamp lands, assumed the
contract to be valid. The same court, in a subsequent suit
involving the nature of the contract, declared it void. The plain-
tiff thereupon brought suit to compel its performance, alleging
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that, as he had acted upon the belief that the first decision was an
affirmation of its validity, he was within the protection of that
clause in the Constitution which provides that the obligation of
contracts shall not be impaired by any State. Held, that the
question as to whether the contract was void or not, was subject
to the final determination of the court, a previous assumption of
its validity having no effect as against the final decision, and that
the plaintiff was not within the protection of the constitutional
provision.
Riparian Righs-"High Water Mfark "-Assessment of Benefits.-
Carpenter et at. v. Board of Commissioners of Hennepin Couno, 58
N. W. Rep. 295 (Minn.) An assessment for benefit on lands
actually damaged by the proposed " beneficial measure" was held
to be void, and the right of the State, in aid of navigation, to
maintain the water of a lake up to ordinary "high-water mark"
without compensation to riparian owners, turns on the construc-
tion of the term "high-water mark." For fresh-water rivers and
lakes, "high-water mark" was held to be a line separating land
valuable for pasturage and agriculture from that rendered useless
by frequent action of the water, a line cotrdinate in no case with
unusual or extraordinary high-water mark.
Roads-Dedication-rescription.-Jones v. Pkillos, Road Overseer,
26 S. W. Rep. 386 (Ark.). The appellee was granted an order
restraining the appellant from obstructing a portion of the public
road, alleged by him to be under his supervision, to which the
appellant eicepted and appeals. Although the appellant permit-
ted the public to use the road which was on her soil, the Court
could discover no intention or acts on her part to make a dedica-
tion. The main contention of the appellee was "that the public
had acquired a. right by prescription-by continuous, uninter-
rupted and adverse use for more than a statutory period." Inas-
much as the owners have never ceased to keep gates and fences
where it enters the field on either side, they have never ceased to
exercise dominion, absolute or qualified.
